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Article 
Dissents Against Type 
Ward Farnsworth† 
Legal realists and various others believe that judges in 
close cases—and thus Supreme Court Justices in most cases—
vote according to their policy preferences, private empirical 
views about the world, and other considerations that have little 
to do with the legal materials bearing on a dispute. For those 
who think this way, a judge who dissents in an unexpected 
ideological direction is a surprise and a challenge: the judge is 
bypassing arguments—arguments favored by at least five col-
leagues—in favor of his accustomed position. Why? Are these 
cases where the commitments to legal methodology (say, to an 
interpretive philosophy) are constraining the judge’s usual in-
clinations?  
This Paper examines such “dissents against type,” distin-
guishes between real and apparent examples of them, and con-
siders whether and how they can be integrated into a realist 
view of judging. Part I examines the Justices’ patterns of dis-
sent in criminal cases, a rich area for study of the question be-
cause of the large number of cases in that field that involve 
similar policy stakes. Part II considers the apparent dissents 
against type made by some particular Justices, asking whether 
they can be explained on ideological grounds or in some other 
way. The Article concludes with some general thoughts about 
when and why apparent dissents against type occur. 
I.  THE EXTENT OF THE PUZZLE   
In prior work I have defended a simple realist view of how 
judges make decisions.1 Their policy preferences compete with 
 
†  Professor of Law and Nancy Barton Scholar, Boston University School 
of Law. Thanks to Dustin Guzior for superb research assistance, and to partic-
ipants at the Minnesota Law Review Symposium, “Law & Politics in the 21st 
Century,” for comments and discussion. Copyright © 2009 by Ward 
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the pressure exerted by the legal materials that bear on the 
cases in front of them; where they conflict, the stronger of the 
two prevails.2 Legal materials that speak decisively to the point 
in dispute can override a judge’s preferences, which is why 
judges with different ideologies nevertheless decide so many 
cases unanimously in the courts of appeals. Legal issues that 
are more evenly balanced don’t have that constraining effect; 
they allow judges to vote either way and have something lega-
listic to say for themselves, which is why appellate judges in 
cases that aren’t unanimous tend to vote along consistent ideo-
logical lines regardless of what sort of legal materials bear on 
the case.  
This also explains why Supreme Court Justices, as distinct 
from judges on lower courts, regularly vote in predictable blocs: 
most cases that get to the Supreme Court, and especially cases 
that produce a split decision there, have solid arguments on 
both sides, so a Justice can take whatever position seems best 
on policy grounds and find legal support for it. This is not a 
claim about how Justices subjectively experience what they are 
doing; it is a claim about what they end up doing, whatever 
their thought process may be. An empirical look at how judges 
vote in criminal cases strongly supports this general model.3 In 
split decisions that involve similar policy stakes, any given 
judge or Justice votes for the government at a fairly consistent 
rate, regardless of whether the underlying legal dispute in-
volves the Constitution or a statute or some other sort of rule.4 
Possible challenges to this legal realist model arise from 
cases where judges vote out of character: cases where a judge 
who typically votes for the government decides to vote for the 
criminal defendant instead (or vice versa), despite having 
plausible arguments to support a vote in the usual direction. 
The most striking of these cases would be dissents against type. 
If a Supreme Court Justice dissents in favor of a defendant, 
then evidently there were arguments to support the govern-
ment’s view—for at least five of his colleagues found them sa-
tisfactory. For a judge to pass by those apparently strong ar-
guments and insist that the defendant is right would seem to 
suggest, on a realist view, a preference to find for the defen-
 
 1. See Ward Farnsworth, Signatures of Ideology: The Case of the Su-
preme Court’s Criminal Docket, 104 MICH. L. REV. 67, 88–96, 99–100 (2005). 
 2. See id. at 71.  
 3. See id. at 69–73. 
 4. See id. 
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dant. So what are we to make of cases where dissents of just 
that sort are made by Justices who, on the evidence of the rest 
of their careers, prefer to rule against defendants? Such beha-
vior, to the extent it occurs, seems inconsistent with the realist 
model.  
A.  THE FREQUENCY OF DISSENTS AGAINST TYPE  
So to what extent do dissents against type occur? The Su-
preme Court’s criminal docket presents a large and useful set of 
cases to consider as a basis for investigating this question, and 
has formed the basis of some of the earlier work described 
above. This Section revisits that work and considers what it 
can teach about the incidence and implications of dissents 
against type.  
First some preliminaries. Before one can analyze dissents 
against type, it is important to define what the “types” are. It’s 
possible to draw conclusions about types from various sources, 
including “ideal points” and variants devised by political scien-
tists,5 various indicia of reputation,6 or the data presented in 
my earlier study of judicial behavior in criminal cases decided 
non-unanimously.7 For present purposes this Paper defines a 
dissent against type more simply (and in a way that, in any 
event, produces conclusions about the same as those other me-
thods): it is a dissent that runs contrary to a strongly estab-
lished tendency found in the rest of the Justice’s votes. On a 
realist or attitudinalist view, any such strong tendencies 
represent ideological commitments or other sorts of priors the 
judges bring to the cases, such as being pro-government or pro-
defendant in a criminal case. When such tendencies can be 
identified, the question becomes why they don’t hold all the 
time; and the stronger the initial tendency to vote one way or 
the other, the more a dissent in the other direction invites ex-
planation.  
With that framework in mind, consider Figure 1 below. It 
displays career data for each Justice on the Court from 1975 to 
the present (through October Term 2007). It reflects their vot-
 
 5. See Ward Farnsworth, The Use and Limits of Martin-Quinn Scores to 
Assess Supreme Court Justices, with Special Attention to the Problem of Ideo-
logical Drift, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 1891, 1892–96 (2007). 
 6. See Jeffrey A. Segal & Albert D. Cover, Ideological Values and the 
Votes of U.S. Supreme Court Justices, 83 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 557, 559–61 
(1989). 
 7. See Farnsworth, supra note 1, at 68–73. 
 1538 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [93:1535 
 
ing behavior in every case that had a criminal defendant on one 
side and the government on the other, whether by way of direct 
appeal from a criminal conviction, on habeas corpus, or in any 
other posture. It then divides those cases according to the 
source of law in dispute: constitutional or not, with the latter 
category covering penal statutes, the habeas corpus statute, 
and rules of evidence and procedure, and so forth.8 
 
Fig. 1: Dissenting Behavior in Criminal Cases by Selected Supreme Court 
Justices. 
 
 
 8. The data for this study—the data used to create the graphs and to 
make the other numerical findings mentioned later—were derived from the 
United States Supreme Court Judicial Database at Michigan State University, 
which was created by Howard Spaeth. The basic method was to seek out all 
cases in the career of each Justice (through the end of October Term 2007) 
that involved criminal law in any form. The results from the Spaeth database 
were then checked against various datasets compiled by hand to help guard 
against omissions that might otherwise result. For an expanded discussion, 
see Farnsworth, supra note 1, at 68 n.7. 
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As the graph shows, every Justice has a decided tendency 
to dissent one way but not the other—for the government and 
not for defendants, or vice versa. The tendency cuts across cas-
es involving different areas of law without much difference, 
which strongly suggests that it is the result of priors the Jus-
tices bring to the cases from outside the legal materials. These 
priors can include policy preferences or various empirical views 
that are relevant to criminal cases of all kinds.9 But then why 
don’t those values and views bring about results even more 
regular than the ones shown here? The question might be pre-
sented in more vivid fashion by combining the statutory and 
constitutional cases and representing them as shown in Figure 
2:  
 
Fig. 2: Proportions of Dissents For and Against Type. 
 
The more the taller line outdistances the shorter one for 
any given Justice, the clearer the tendency the Justice displays 
to dissent one way but not the other. The curiosity this pro-
vokes involves the short lines. What happens in those cases 
that don’t follow form? If a Justice votes for the government 
95% of the time, why not 100%? These questions are raised by 
 
 9. See Farnsworth, supra note 1, at 91–96. 
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the numbers but can’t be resolved by them. Understanding 
when and why dissents against type occur requires a look at 
what happened in those cases.  
II.  REAL AND APPARENT DISSENTS AGAINST TYPE: 
SOME CASE STUDIES   
This Part examines the apparent dissents against type rec-
orded by the more extreme Justices in the charts just shown. 
The goal is to understand better the various reasons why Jus-
tices ever appear to dissent against type, and also to see how 
the dissents may shed light on their authors and our under-
standing of what their “types” really are. There are limits to 
what one can conclude from this data about any particular Jus-
tice, because dissents against type are partly a group effort; a 
Justice cannot dissent against type unless he gets cooperation 
of a certain kind from his colleagues, five of whom have to vote 
one way so that he can vote the other. But there nevertheless 
are interesting observations to make about the cases where 
such dissents do occur, and about Justices in whose careers 
such dissents almost never occur.  
A.  WILLIAM REHNQUIST AND OTHER EXTREME CASES 
William Rehnquist, who served on the Court from 1971 un-
til his death in 2005,10 participated in well over a thousand 
criminal cases and in general was a reliable vote for the gov-
ernment.11 The earlier charts showed how rarely he dissented 
in favor of a criminal defendant, but there are several more de-
tails that deserve mention. The first point to observe is simple: 
one hesitates to make categorical statements, but in more than 
thirty years on the Court, Rehnquist appears never to have 
written or joined a dissent in favor of a defendant on a point of 
constitutional law. It seems rather astonishing, at least on any 
but a hard-line realist view, that he never once saw a case 
where he thought a defendant’s claim of constitutional right 
was incorrectly denied, but no such instance appears in the da-
ta.12  
 
 10. Rehnquist joined the Court as an Associate Justice on January 7, 
1972, became Chief Justice on September 26, 1986, and died on September 3, 
2005. Douglas W. Kmiec, Overview of the Term: The Rule of Law & Roberts’s 
Revolution of Restraint, 34 PEPP. L. REV. 495, 509 n.90 (2007). 
 11. See Farnsworth, supra note 1, at 69. 
 12. The process of generating and searching data for this purpose leaves 
room for an individual case to be missed if its coding in the Spaeth database is 
 2009] DISSENTS AGAINST TYPE 1541 
 
The perfect regularity of Rehnquist’s constitutional dis-
sents might, in principle, be explained on legalistic grounds in 
two ways. The first is that he was an originalist surrounded by 
colleagues who weren’t;13 so he was less inclined to join expan-
sive readings of the Constitution than anyone else—and if he 
thought such a reading was appropriate, a fortiori there always 
were at least four colleagues who would agree with him.14 The 
other possibility, related but distinct, is that he was applying 
legal principles in a manner indifferent to policy, but was sur-
rounded mostly by colleagues who would bend a point to find 
for a defendant whenever they could. The result, again, would 
be that in any case where Rehnquist was inclined to vote for a 
defendant, there automatically would be at least four more 
votes the same way.  
Neither of these explanations seems convincing. Rehnquist 
was a less intense proponent of originalism than Justice Scalia, 
who, as we shall see, does dissent in favor of defendants from 
time to time in constitutional cases. And while Rehnquist had a 
number of colleagues who seemed to vote for the defendant 
whenever it was plausible to do so, he had many others who 
weren’t like that at all.  
The use of originalism to explain Rehnquist’s pattern of 
dissent also does not explain the very similar pattern he dis-
played in criminal cases that involved statutes or other non-
constitutional sources of law to which originalism has no appli-
cation.15 It is possible to suggest that a commitment to original-
ism in constitutional cases will incline a Justice to vote for the 
 
unexpected or idiosyncratic in some way. If any reader knows of a constitu-
tional case in which Justice Rehnquist did dissent for a defendant, kindly for-
ward it to the author’s attention.  
 13. See Peter J. Smith, The Marshall Court and the Originalist’s Dilem-
ma, 90 MINN. L. REV. 612, 669 (2006) (describing Chief Justice Rehnquist as 
among the Court’s “most ardent proponents of originalism as a methodology of 
constitutional interpretation”).  
 14. See, e.g., Deck v. Missouri, 544 U.S. 622, 633–35 (2005) (joining a ma-
jority opinion holding that the use of visible restraints before a jury violates 
due process); Smith v. Texas, 543 U.S. 37, 48 (2004) (per curiam) (agreeing 
with the majority opinion that a nullification instruction failed to allow the 
jury to fully consider mitigating evidence); Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 
534–38 (2003) (agreeing that counsel’s failure to investigate mitigating evi-
dence beyond a presentence report violated the Sixth Amendment right to ef-
fective assistance of counsel).  
 15. See Earl M. Maltz, Introduction to REHNQUIST JUSTICE: UNDERSTAND-
ING THE COURT DYNAMIC 1, 5 (Earl M. Maltz ed., 2003) (defining “originalism” 
as a theory of constitutional interpretation whereby the Constitution’s mean-
ing is fixed by the “original understanding” of its language). 
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government a lot, because originalism will systematically dis-
favor arguments by defendants that protections in the Bill of 
Rights should be expanded for their benefit. But there is no 
theory of statutory interpretation that can be expected to pro-
duce such a systematic preference for the government’s posi-
tions.  
As strong an exhibit as Rehnquist makes in the realist de-
scription of the Court’s work, he did make very occasional dis-
sents against type in criminal matters not involving the Consti-
tution—ten of them, to be precise; what can we learn from 
those cases? First, in eight of those cases,16 Rehnquist’s dissent 
was based on the rule of lenity—the doctrine that if the scope of 
a criminal statute’s coverage is unclear, the ambiguities should 
be resolved in favor of the defendant.17 And with one exception, 
all of Rehnquist’s dissents for defendants, whether or not they 
involved the rule of lenity, involved disputes about substantive 
criminal law, not procedure. This helps clarify the pattern that 
Rehnquist presents, because cases about substantive criminal 
law and cases about criminal procedure involve fundamentally 
different policy considerations and ideological stakes. Substan-
tive disputes, from a policy standpoint, require judgments 
about who deserves punishment and deterrence and who does 
not. Procedural disputes assume those questions are resolved 
and ask how many resources ought to be spent making sure the 
government has caught the right person; they call for tradeoffs 
between accuracy on the one hand and finality or cost on the 
other, and depend significantly on how much one trusts the 
government or is concerned about abuses.18  
Justice Rehnquist was a little (but only a little) solicitous of 
defendants with respect to the first sort of question—the subs-
 
 16. See Lopez v. Davis, 531 U.S. 230, 245–49 (2001) (Stevens, J., dissent-
ing); Bryan v. United States, 524 U.S. 184, 200–05 (1998) (Scalia, J., dissent-
ing); Muscarello v. United States, 524 U.S. 125, 139–50 (1998) (Ginsburg, J., 
dissenting); Rogers v. United States, 522 U.S. 252, 260–61 (1998) (Kennedy, 
J., dissenting); United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 680–701 (1997) (Tho-
mas, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part); Evans v. United States, 504 
U.S. 255, 278–97 (1992) (Thomas, J., dissenting); United States v. Yermian, 
468 U.S. 63, 75–84 (1984) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Dixson v. United States, 
465 U.S. 482, 501–12 (1984) (O’Connor, J., dissenting). Justice Rehnquist’s 
“dissents” are not always his own dissenting opinions, but include those au-
thored by other Justices. I use this terminology throughout the Article.  
 17. See Farnsworth, supra note 1, at 72–73, 97–99.  
 18. Cf. id. at 97 (“The best explanation probably is that substantive cases, 
unlike almost all the others, don’t involve an underlying trade-off between ac-
curacy and its costs.”). 
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tantive kind. That is the question to which the rule of lenity is 
relevant, and he relied on it from time to time. With respect to 
the second set of issues—procedural matters of all sorts—the 
numbers suggest that Rehnquist was as committed to the gov-
ernment’s side of the battle as consistently as any Justice ever 
was. So far as the record reveals, he believed that during his 
thirty-three years on the Court only one decision there gave 
criminal defendants any less procedure than they were due: the 
rather obscure United States v. Gillock, which held that state 
politicians prosecuted for bribery can have their legislative acts 
used as evidence against them.19 Rehnquist’s opinion in that 
zenith of his procedural solicitude for defendants reads in its 
entirety as follows: “For the reasons stated by Chief Judge Ed-
wards in his opinion in this case for the Court of Appeals for 
the Sixth Circuit, I would affirm the judgment of that court.”20 
We find some other striking patterns when we turn to the 
facts of Rehnquist’s dissents for defendants. Half of the ten cas-
es involve white-collar criminal defendants: three prosecutions 
of politicians for bribery or extortion;21 one of a defendant 
charged with violations of the securities laws;22 and one of a de-
fendant for making false statements to the Department of De-
fense.23 Cases of this general kind make up a substantial but 
not proportionate share of the Court’s criminal docket—less 
than ten percent—so their prominence among Rehnquist’s dis-
sents is notable. The other half of Rehnquist’s dissents for de-
fendants involves firearms. In one of them the defendant had a 
gun and the question was whether the law criminalized this 
even though the defendant never left the state to obtain it,24 
or—in another case—even though the gun was in his glove 
compartment (and thus perhaps wasn’t being “carried” by 
him),25 or—in still another case—even if he didn’t know that 
 
 19. See 445 U.S. 360, 371, 374 (1980). 
 20. Id. at 374. 
 21. Evans, 504 U.S. at 278–97 (Thomas, J., dissenting); Dixson, 465 U.S. 
at 501–12 (O’Connor, J., dissenting); Gillock, 445 U.S. at 374 (Rehnquist, J., 
dissenting). 
 22. United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 680–701 (1997) (Thomas, J., 
concurring in part, dissenting in part). 
 23. United States v. Yermian, 468 U.S. 63, 75–84 (1984) (Rehnquist, J., 
dissenting). 
 24. Barrett v. United States, 423 U.S. 212, 228–32 (1976) (Stewart, J., 
dissenting).  
 25. Muscarello v. United States, 524 U.S. 125, 139–50 (1998) (Ginsburg, 
J., dissenting). 
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his silencer counted as a “firearm” for legal purposes.26 In 
another, a criminal defendant was selling guns without a li-
cense, but didn’t know of the licensing requirement.27 In yet 
another, the defendant was in prison and was denied early re-
lease because his offense included possession of a gun, and the 
Bureau of Prisons therefore held him to be automatically guilty 
of a crime of violence.28 Majorities of the Court found for the 
government in all these cases, and Rehnquist dissented in favor 
of the defendant in all of them. Firearms cases of these kinds 
make up roughly ten percent of the Court’s statutory caseload 
on the criminal side, so their large share of Rehnquist’s dis-
sents seems noteworthy. Perhaps owners of guns, along with 
white-collar criminal defendants, are segments of the criminal 
defendant population most likely to seem familiar or otherwise 
sympathetic to a conservative in our times.  
In the end it seems questionable whether William Rehn-
quist ever really did dissent against ideological type in the 
criminal area. His dissents may merely clarify what his ideolog-
ical type was: a Justice committed not precisely to the govern-
ment but to certain values usually associated with the govern-
ment’s position: law and order, yes, but especially finality, trust 
of the police and prosecutors, and administrative savings.  
Rehnquist is useful to discuss because he epitomizes the 
type of Justice that legal realists and political scientists have in 
mind when they put forward ideological models of judging. But 
I do not mean to suggest that Rehnquist is by himself in this. 
In seventeen years on the Court, Warren Burger dissented in 
favor of a defendant only once—in a statutory case, in favor of a 
corporate defendant charged with criminal acts of pollution.29 
Nor are these patterns confined to the right. Thurgood Mar-
shall never dissented in favor of the government in a constitu-
tional case involving a criminal defendant; of the six statutory 
cases where he did dissent for the government, half involved 
white collar crimes,30 two involved the jurisdiction of Indian 
 
 26. Rogers v. United States, 522 U.S. 252, 260–61 (1998) (Kennedy, J., 
dissenting). 
 27. Bryan v. United States, 524 U.S. 184, 200–05 (1998) (Scalia, J., dis-
senting). 
 28. Lopez v. Davis, 531 U.S. 230, 245–49 (2001) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 29. United States v. Pa. Indus. Chem. Corp., 411 U.S. 655, 675 (1973) 
(Burger, C.J., dissenting). 
 30. Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192, 209–10 (1991) (Blackmun, J., 
dissenting) (tax evasion); Williams v. United States, 458 U.S. 279, 292–306 
(1982) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (check kiting scheme); Chiarella v. United 
 2009] DISSENTS AGAINST TYPE 1545 
 
courts,31 and one involved the power of Guam to create a Su-
preme Court.32 William Brennan was similar. He dissented for 
the government in a criminal constitutional matter just once, in 
Estes v. Texas,33 where the question was whether the defen-
dant’s rights had been violated by broadcasting his trial on tel-
evision. Brennan joined a dissent saying that televised trials 
were a bad idea but not a constitutional violation. The case 
might be understood as having more to do with freedom of the 
press than with criminal law; the dissent said that there were 
“intimations” in the majority opinion that were “disturbingly 
alien” to the First Amendment.34 As for Brennan’s statutory 
dissents for the government, there were four, most of them the 
now-familiar white-collar variety.35 
B.  JOHN PAUL STEVENS AND THE PROBLEM OF FAUX DISSENTS 
AGAINST TYPE 
As Figures 1 and 2 show, Justice Stevens is the member of 
the current Court least likely to dissent in favor of the govern-
ment.36 His apparent dissents against type, in which a majority 
voted for a criminal defendant but he did not, fall into three ba-
sic categories. First, sometimes a criminal case isn’t really a 
criminal case: it does involve a criminal defendant, but raises 
issues of law not necessarily—and perhaps not normally—
associated with crime and punishment. In those situations it is 
no surprise to see the Justices vote according to their policy 
preferences on the true issue in the forefront of the case, which 
incidentally may produce an unexpected outcome for the crimi-
 
States, 445 U.S. 222, 245–52 (1980) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (securities 
fraud).  
 31. Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 698–710 (1990) (Brennan, J., dissenting); 
Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 212 (1978) (Marshall, J., 
dissenting). 
 32. Guam v. Olsen, 431 U.S. 195, 204–08 (1977) (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
 33. 381 U.S. 532, 601–16 (1965) (Stewart, J., dissenting). 
 34. Id. at 614. 
 35. Williams v. United States, 458 U.S. 279, 292–306 (1982) (Marshall, J., 
dissenting); Adamo Wrecking Co. v. United States, 434 U.S. 275, 291–93 
(1978) (Stewart, J., dissenting) (prosecution under Clean Air Act); United 
States v. Maze, 414 U.S. 395, 408–17 (1974) (White, J., dissenting) (credit card 
fraud scheme); United States v. Johnson, 383 U.S. 169, 186–89 (1966) (War-
ren, C.J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (prosecution of politician for 
conspiracy).  
 36. For discussion of Stevens’s ideology and its development over time, see 
Ward Farnsworth, Realism, Pragmatism, and John Paul Stevens, in REHN-
QUIST JUSTICE: UNDERSTANDING THE COURT DYNAMIC, supra note 15, at 157. 
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nal defendant. A vivid example from Justice Stevens is United 
States v. Lopez,37 in which the Court struck down the Gun-Free 
School Zones Act of 1990.38 The five more conservative mem-
bers of the Court formed the majority; the four more liberal 
members, including Stevens, dissented. From one point of view 
these votes might all seem to be “against type,” because in ef-
fect the conservatives were all voting in favor of the criminal 
defendant who had been prosecuted under the law, while the 
liberals were all voting in support of the federal government. 
But the explanation is obvious: Lopez really wasn’t a criminal 
case. It was a case about congressional authority; by far the 
most important stakes of the case involved the extent of con-
gressional power under the Commerce Clause. So Lopez, prop-
erly understood, produced no actual dissents against type, and 
situations of this kind account for an important portion of that 
small set of cases where such dissents seem to occur. Stevens 
has other dissents like this, too, including flag-burning cases 
where he rejected the defendant’s First Amendment arguments 
and dissented for the government.39 In a sense those are crimi-
nal cases, but nobody thinks of them that way. 
Second, Stevens, like most Justices, has cast a fair number 
of votes that look like dissents against type until one examines 
the facts and notices that they tend to involve the scope of laws 
meant to catch white-collar criminals, which he reads broad-
ly.40 There is enough behavior against type in those white-
collar cases that they may require refinement of our under-
standing of the type rather than our understandings of the Jus-
tices involved. Perhaps the “liberal” type is harder on white-
collar criminals, while the “conservative” type is more lenient. 
This conjecture fits the facts, for cases involving white-collar 
criminals provoke dissents against type considerably more of-
ten than one would expect from the share of the Court’s crimi-
nal docket they constitute. 
 
 37. 514 U.S. 549, 615–44 (1995) (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 38. 18 U.S.C. § 922(q) (2006). 
 39. See United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310, 319–24 (1990) (Stevens, 
J., dissenting); Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 436–37 (1989) (Stevens, J., 
dissenting). 
 40. See, e.g., McCormick v. United States, 500 U.S. 257, 280–90 (1991) 
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (prosecution of a state politician under the Hobbs 
Act); United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 474–77 (1978) (Stevens, 
J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (antitrust prosecution); United 
States v. LaSalle Nat’l Bank, 437 U.S. 298, 319–21 (1978) (Stewart, J., dis-
senting) (prosecution of a bank for tax offenses). 
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Last, there are a handful of cases—one every half-dozen 
years or so—where Justice Stevens unexpectedly dissents in 
favor of the government on a question under the Fourth, Fifth, 
or Sixth Amendments—such as Pennsylvania v. Muniz,41 where 
he dissented in favor of the government in a prosecution of a 
drunk driver who complained about the use of statements he 
made during a sobriety test before being read his Miranda 
rights; and Kyllo v. United States,42 where Stevens would have 
allowed the use of thermal imaging technology without a war-
rant to detect marijuana cultivation inside a house.43  
Are these dissents against type? They are if Stevens’s 
“type” is one who always votes for the defendant. But in fact 
that has never quite been his approach. Stevens has long been 
an unpredictable vote—whether in the majority or in dissent—
in cases arising under certain branches of these constitutional 
provisions. He has written or joined majority opinions—
opinions which provoked dissent—that upheld dog sniffs con-
ducted during routine traffic stops,44 detention of the occupants 
of a house while it is searched,45 and searches of a suspect’s 
garbage without a warrant.46 Then again, Stevens has written 
dissents for defendants in which he argued for broad readings 
of the exclusionary rule,47 and against allowing police to order 
drivers out of their cars without a showing of good ground for 
suspicion.48  
It is difficult to explain this patchwork of results. It may be 
that Justice Stevens has weak policy preferences in these 
areas, so that the outcomes he favors wander back and forth for 
lack of a rudder. It may also be that he does have preferences 
but that they are disciplined by his commitment to legal me-
 
 41. 496 U.S. 582, 606–08 (1990) (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part, dis-
senting in part). 
 42. 533 U.S. 27, 41–51 (2001) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 43. For other, earlier examples, see Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. 420, 
444–53 (1981) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (advocating for a broader “automobile 
exception” to the Fourth Amendment than the one adopted by the majority) 
and Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 620–36 (1976) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (ar-
guing that using silence after Miranda warnings against defendants should be 
allowed). 
 44. Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 405–10 (2005). 
 45. Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 692–706 (1981). 
 46. California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 35–45 (1988). 
 47. Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796, 817–40 (1984) (Stevens, J., dis-
senting). 
 48. Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 115–24 (1977) (Stevens, J., dis-
senting). 
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thod, but this hypothesis is hard to support with any evidence 
because his decisions do not follow from any particular method; 
he is an “all-things-considered” sort of judge who avoids large 
statements.49  
What is true, however, is that Stevens is a much more reli-
able vote for criminal defendants in a different procedural con-
text: petitions for habeas corpus. The irregularity of his votes in 
some areas (e.g., search and seizure) and the regularity of them 
in the other (habeas corpus) tends to suggest that consistent le-
gal method is not likely at the root of these patterns. The better 
explanation is probably that Justice Stevens does care very 
much about a certain aspect of criminal procedure: he believes 
strongly in laying out resources for the sake of accuracy and 
opportunities to protest an unfair trial. He just is not nearly as 
concerned about restraining the government at the front end of 
the process, when it is gathering evidence—for the costs of in-
vaded rights then are to liberty rather than to accuracy. On this 
view of the cases, it becomes less clear whether Stevens’s dis-
sents in cases like Kyllo are against type. Such votes are not 
what one might expect of a “liberal” Justice, but they aren’t re-
ally surprising once one more precisely considers the evidence 
of what Stevens values and what he doesn’t. If Stevens dis-
sented in favor of the government in a case about the scope of 
habeas corpus, that truly would seem to be behavior against 
type so far as his type now appears. But it never has happened. 
C.  ANTONIN SCALIA AND HOW LEGAL METHOD MAY CONSTRAIN  
Antonin Scalia has served on the Supreme Court for twen-
ty-two years, and like Rehnquist he is conservative by reputa-
tion and tends to vote for the government in criminal cases;50 
the two therefore produce instructive comparisons. While some 
of the same trends seen in Rehnquist’s career are evident in 
Figure 2 as well, Justice Scalia has dissented in favor of defen-
dants more often: thirty-two times in total, nineteen of them 
statutory and thirteen constitutional. Most of the statutory dis-
sents involve substantive criminal law rather than procedure, 
with about two-thirds of them relying on the rule of lenity, to 
which he is a more consistent adherent than Rehnquist. Scalia 
also has dissented for defendants in a somewhat wider range of 
factual situations.51 Most interestingly by way of contrast, Sca-
 
 49. See Farnsworth, supra note 36, at 167.  
 50. See Farnsworth, supra note 1, at 69. 
 51. This is true even in his dissents on substantive matters. In Holloway 
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lia has sometimes dissented in favor of defendants on proce-
dural grounds. A couple of these dissents have come in statuto-
ry cases,52 but the more notable departure comes on the consti-
tutional side. Scalia has dissented in favor of defendants in 
cases involving the interpretation of the Fourth,53 Fifth,54 
Sixth,55 and Fourteenth56 Amendments, including a couple of 
dissents apiece in favor of defendants making claims of double 
jeopardy57 or arguing that some feature of the proof against 
them must be established beyond reasonable doubt—an issue 
on which, after dissenting twice in related cases,58 Scalia pro-
vided the fifth vote to secure victory for the defendant in the 
highly consequential decision of Apprendi v. New Jersey.59  
I see nothing in the facts of these constitutional cases to 
suggest that they are faux dissents against type that express 
conservative policy preferences. In all the cases just cited, Sca-
lia’s position put him in company with the more liberal mem-
bers of the Court and at odds with the usual conservatives, al-
 
v. United States, 526 U.S. 1, 12–22 (1999), for example, the defendant had put 
a gun in the face of a driver and told him to get out of the car so he could steal 
it. Holloway hadn’t wanted to shoot the driver (and didn’t), but would have 
done so if the driver had given him a “hard time.” The question was whether, 
on these facts, Holloway had an “intent to cause death or great bodily harm.” 
The majority said that he did; Scalia dissented, saying the statute was ambi-
guous and that the ambiguity should be resolved in Holloway’s favor. Hollo-
way was far from being a white-collar defendant. 
 52. See Day v. McDonough, 547 U.S. 198, 212–19 (2006) (Scalia, J., dis-
senting) (arguing that a complaint about the untimeliness of a habeas corpus 
petition should be considered waived if not pressed by the state); Johnson v. 
United States, 544 U.S. 295, 312–19 (2005) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (arguing 
that the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act does not require due 
diligence in seeking vacatur of a state conviction); United States v. Rodriguez-
Moreno, 526 U.S. 275, 282–85 (1999) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Peretz v. United 
States, 501 U.S. 923, 952–56 (1991) (Scalia, J., dissenting).  
 53. County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 59–71 (1991) (Scalia, 
J., dissenting). 
 54. Braswell v. United States, 487 U.S. 99, 119–30 (1988) (Kennedy, J., 
dissenting). 
 55. Indiana v. Edwards, 128 S. Ct. 2379, 2389–94 (2008) (Scalia, J., dis-
senting); Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 860–70 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissent-
ing). 
 56. Rogers v. Tennessee, 532 U.S. 451, 467–81 (2001) (Scalia, J., dissent-
ing). 
 57. United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 226–31 (2004) (Souter, J., dis-
senting); Jones v. Thomas, 491 U.S. 376, 388–96 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 58. Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 30–40 (1999) (Scalia, J., concur-
ring in part, dissenting in part); Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 
224, 248–71 (1998) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 59. 530 U.S. 466, 468 (2000). 
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ways including Rehnquist. In County of Riverside v. McLaugh-
lin, for example, the plaintiff brought a class action suit chal-
lenging the length of time the county allowed between the point 
when defendants were arrested without a warrant and the lat-
er moment when a showing of probable cause had to be made 
before a judge.60 The majority found for the county; Scalia dis-
sented, along with Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens, arguing 
that the county violated the Fourth Amendment by depriving 
defendants of protections afforded them by the common law.61 
In Maryland v. Craig, the defendant was convicted of child 
abuse based on testimony provided by the child through a 
closed-circuit television broadcast to the courtroom.62 While the 
majority upheld the conviction, Scalia dissented—again with 
Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens—saying the state violated the 
plain language of the Sixth Amendment by not permitting the 
defendant to confront her accuser.63 He again dissented with 
Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens in Jones v. Thomas,64 a 
double-jeopardy case involving a defendant convicted of theft 
and felony murder; and in Rogers v. Tennessee65 he dissented in 
favor of a convicted murderer on the ground that his crime was 
only manslaughter at the time it was committed, saying among 
other things that the majority’s decision violated the original 
understanding of the Ex Post Facto Clause.66 
In short, Justice Scalia appears to have methodological 
commitments that sometimes cause him to dissent (and other-
wise vote) against type. The significance of the finding should 
not be exaggerated. Lots of Justices will look legalistic by com-
parison when set next to William Rehnquist; and as I have 
shown elsewhere, Justice Scalia usually does vote for the gov-
ernment in constitutional as well as statutory cases involving 
crime and punishment.67 Most cases do not present clear occa-
sions for use of those methodological commitments he has, so 
then he evidently votes according to his policy preferences, 
usually clothing them—as all Justices do—in the language of 
whatever constitutional tests or precedents the Court has in 
 
 60. 500 U.S. 44, 47 (1991). 
 61. Id. at 59–71 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 62. 497 U.S. 836, 843 (1990). 
 63. Id. at 860–70 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 64. 491 U.S. 376, 388–96 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 65. 532 U.S. 451, 467–81 (2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 66. Id.   
 67. See Farnsworth, supra note 1, at 69. 
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place for decision of the issue. And of course one can ponder 
larger questions about whether a commitment to those methods 
is attractive to Scalia precisely because they usually produce 
results he likes, yet frustrate him just often enough to give the 
look of law to his conduct. But those sorts of speculations really 
are beyond the scope of this inquiry. For now let us be content 
to note that once in a while a criminal case does squarely lend 
itself to decision for the defendant on textual or originalist 
grounds, and Justice Scalia votes accordingly, at least some-
times, even if the arguments for the government are good 
enough for five of his colleagues.  
D.  DAVID SOUTER AND THE HAZARDS OF DRAWING 
CONCLUSIONS FROM A JUSTICE’S EARLY YEARS ON THE COURT 
Justice Souter’s patterns of apparent dissents against type 
look something like those of Justice Stevens, starting with a 
couple that really aren’t against type after all. One of them is 
Lopez, the Commerce Clause case.68 Another is an excellent ex-
ample of a dissent that appears to be against type only until its 
facts are fully appreciated: Koon v. United States, where the de-
fendants were police officers convicted of various crimes arising 
from their well-publicized beating of Rodney King.69 The Court 
took the case to consider whether the sentences the officers re-
ceived were too harsh. The most divisive issue was whether the 
officers should have received reduced sentences because they 
were likely to be beaten in prison by other inmates who had 
heard about the case.70 On this point Justices Souter, Ginsburg, 
and Breyer dissented in favor of the government. Their argu-
ment had as much to do with the dissenters’ notions of morality 
and good sense as with any source of law from the federal sen-
tencing guidelines:  
To allow a departure on this basis is to reason, in effect, that the more 
serious the crime, and the more widespread its consequent publicity 
and condemnation, the less one should be punished; the more egre-
gious the act, the less culpable the offender. In the terminology of the 
Guidelines, such reasoning would take the heartland to be the domain 
of the less, not the more, deplorable of the acts that might come with-
in the statute. This moral irrationality cannot be attributed to the 
heartland scheme, however, and rewarding the relatively severe of-
 
 68. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 603–14 (1995) (Souter, J., dis-
senting). 
 69. 518 U.S. 81, 114–18 (1996) (Souter, J., concurring in part, dissenting 
in part). 
 70. Id. at 112 (majority opinion).  
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fender could hardly have been in the contemplation of a Commission 
that discouraged downward departures for susceptibility to prison 
abuse even when the nonculpable reason is an unusual “[p]hysical . . . 
appearance, including physique.”71 
So it might seem that we have dissents against type, and 
indeed votes against type by most of the Justices—but only on 
a superficial view of the case. On closer inspection the results 
seem easily understood as consistent with how Souter and his 
dissenting colleagues vote in other criminal cases. These we-
ren’t typical criminal defendants; they were police officers, and 
indeed they were officers charged with overzealous conduct in 
subduing a criminal defendant who was more typical. In this 
case voting for the government thus was not a clear-cut vote for 
law and order at the expense of defendants’ rights; it might bet-
ter be understood as the opposite. Probably the best view is 
that it was a mixed case, where the usual policies at stake in 
criminal disputes ran in both directions. That is why the case 
produced not only some dissents and other votes against type, 
but also the odd alignment of Justice Stevens with the conserv-
ative faction of the Court. When the same general policy inter-
ests are at stake on both sides of a case, it’s hard to predict how 
any particular Justice will balance them. Koon thus is an un-
usually vivid example of a case where some feature of the facts 
causes the usual proxies for policy preferences to be misleading 
or at least incomplete. Most apparent dissents against type 
don’t involve quite such an obvious reversal, but many of them 
do involve defendants who, while not police officers, neverthe-
less seem to be of recurring interest to some of the Justices for 
one reason or another—such as the prosecuted politician or 
other white collar defendant. 
Justice Souter joined two other dissents for the govern-
ment that seem idiosyncratic because they are neither the 
product of any particular legal method nor of anything obvious 
in the facts. But both involve substantive criminal law, and one 
involves a white-collar defendant, so neither is very surprising 
by this point in our inquiry; those are the sorts of issues that 
often provoke votes which seem uncharacteristic.72  
 
 71. Id. at 116 (Souter, J., dissenting) (quoting U.S. SENTENCING GUIDE-
LINES MANUAL § 5H1.4 (1995)). 
 72. Begay v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 1581, 1592–97 (2008) (Alito, J., dis-
senting) (arguing that driving under the influence of alcohol counts as a “se-
rious” crime); Hubbard v. United States, 514 U.S. 695, 718–24 (1995) (Rehn-
quist, C.J., dissenting) (arguing that the petitioner’s conviction under the 
Federal False Claims Act should have been upheld). 
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More interesting, though, are the three more-or-less consti-
tutional dissents for the government that Souter wrote or 
joined in 1991 and 1992 during his first two terms.73 In Strin-
ger v. Black, the defendant had been sentenced to death and 
was seeking habeas corpus.74 The question was whether he 
could rely on a decision that had been issued after his convic-
tion which suggested the jury in his case had received an un-
constitutional instruction. The majority said that he could rely 
on the later decision; Justice Souter wrote a dissent, joined by 
Scalia and Thomas, to argue that such reliance was forbidden 
because the intervening decision of the Court had announced a 
“new rule” under the doctrine of Teague v. Lane.75 Similarly, in 
Arizona v. Fulminante, Souter joined Rehnquist, Kennedy, and 
O’Connor in dissent from the majority’s view that the defen-
dant in the case had made an involuntary confession.76 Souter 
also joined Rehnquist, Scalia, and White in another capital 
case, Lankford v. Ohio,77 dissenting from the majority’s view 
that the defendant did not receive enough notice that he might 
be sentenced to death. 
These dissents—just the direction of them, without refer-
ence to the reasoning—are a bit startling to anyone who follows 
Souter’s work because it is hard to imagine him taking such po-
sitions now; and indeed he has not written or joined a dissent 
in favor of the government in a constitutional case in the six-
teen years since Stringer. It seems clear enough what hap-
pened: it took Souter a couple of years to figure out what sort of 
Justice he was going to be. He arrived more conservative than 
he became only a few years later, and by the mid-1990s he had 
arrived at a more liberal ideological identity that seems to have 
been stable since then.78  
The phenomenon is noted here because it is of general in-
terest; it is not limited to Souter. A similar pattern can be 
 
 73. Stringer v. Black, 503 U.S. 222, 238–48 (1992) (Souter, J., dissenting); 
Lankford v. Ohio, 500 U.S. 110, 128–35 (1991) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Arizona 
v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 302–06 (1991) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). I say 
“more or less” because Stringer could possibly be characterized as a nonconsti-
tutional decision, depending on how one interprets Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 
288 (1989). 
 74. Stringer, 503 U.S. at 224–25 (majority opinion). 
 75. Teague, 489 U.S. at 288. 
 76. Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 302–06 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). 
 77. Lankford, 500 U.S. at 128–35 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 78. See Lee Epstein et al., Ideological Drift Among Supreme Court Justic-
es: Who, When, and How Important, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 1483, 1504–10 (2007). 
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found, for example, in the career of Harry Blackmun: during 
his first two terms on the court (1970 and 1971) all of his dis-
sents in criminal cases were in favor of the government, and 
roughly eighty-four percent of his total votes were in the gov-
ernment’s favor. Later in his career (from 1972 to 1994), 
Blackmun’s voting pattern changed dramatically: only fifty-
eight percent of his total votes were in the government’s favor, 
and 157 out of 217 of his dissents in criminal cases favored the 
defendant. These examples support the general point that per-
haps one should not be too quick to draw conclusions about 
Justices based on their first year or two on the Court.79 These 
results also illustrate how dissents against type generally can 
be used to track ideological movement. Souter went from some-
times dissenting for the government and never for defendants 
to never dissenting for the government and often dissenting for 
defendants.  
E.  STEPHEN BREYER AND THE OCCASIONAL DIFFICULTY OF 
DEFINING LIBERAL AND CONSERVATIVE POSITIONS  
Most of Justice Breyer’s dissents against type—that is, 
against defendants—can be sorted into two categories. He has 
dissented in a long series of cases about whether facts that in-
crease a defendant’s prison sentence have to be proved beyond 
a reasonable doubt.80 He also has dissented for defendants in a 
few statutory cases that likewise involved sentencing.81 Sen-
tencing cases, like disputes about substantive criminal law (of 
which they might be considered a branch), do not involve the 
trade-offs that predictably divide liberals and conservatives. 
There is no question of finality, or of accuracy; instead the de-
fendant is assumed to have committed the crime charged, and 
it only remains to say how long he should go to prison. On that 
question Breyer has no particularly “liberal” inclinations (as 
Justice Scalia, for example, does); but perhaps it is best here 
 
 79. See Lee Epstein et al., On the Perils of Drawing Inferences About Su-
preme Court Justices from Their First Few Years of Service, 91 JUDICATURE 
168, 168–79 (2008). 
 80. Cunningham v. California, 549 U.S. 270, 295–311 (2007) (Kennedy, J., 
dissenting); Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 328–47 (2004) (Breyer, J., 
dissenting); Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 555–66 (2000) (Breyer, J., 
dissenting); Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 254–74 (1999) (Kennedy, J., 
dissenting). 
 81. Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13, 28–39 (2005) (O’Connor, J., 
dissenting); Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 118–19 (1996) (Breyer, J., 
concurring in part, dissenting in part).  
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just to conclude that in this time and place, it’s not very clear 
what, if anything, the liberal and conservative positions are on 
the subject of sentencing. The same might be said about dis-
putes over double jeopardy, where the question is whether con-
viction or acquittal of crime X should prevent prosecution for 
X1. Justice Breyer has dissented for the government once in a 
case of that kind, too.82 Double jeopardy disputes, like disputes 
over sentencing, do not involve the trade-offs that we have seen 
are most likely to split the Justices predictably along ideologi-
cal lines. 
Justice Breyer’s few other dissents for the government are 
somewhat idiosyncratic and miscellaneous in character, but 
most of them can be explained without much trouble. One of 
them—United States v. Santos—is the sort of substantive dis-
pute that produces strange bedfellows once in a while: the 
question was simply whether the defendant’s conduct fell with-
in the statute.83 There is also United States v. Lopez, of course, 
which is not really a dissent against type, as already discussed. 
Justice Breyer also dissented in a case concerning the validity 
of a conviction entered by a judicial panel in Guam, which has 
less to do with crime and punishment than with the power of a 
territorial government.84 There is the case where a father was 
accused of sexually abusing his child and the government 
wanted to bring in evidence that the child’s testimony against 
him was corroborated by other statements the child had made 
outside of court;85 here again the majority found for the defen-
dant, while Justice Breyer dissented for the government—but 
perhaps this can be understood as a case like Koon where the 
parties involved provoke unusual sympathies. A vote for the 
government in this case would not have come at the expense of 
a vulnerable defendant, but in favor of the interests of his 
daughter, who might be viewed as even more vulnerable.86 Ex-
plicable on similar grounds is Breyer’s recent dissent for the 
government in Giles v. California, which involved a claim un-
der the Confrontation Clause.87 The defendant was a man con-
 
 82. Smith v. Massachusetts, 543 U.S. 462, 475–80 (2005) (Ginsburg, J., 
dissenting). 
 83. 128 S. Ct. 2020, 2035–45 (2008) (Alito, J., dissenting). 
 84. Nguyen v. United States, 539 U.S. 69, 83–89 (2003) (Rehnquist, C.J., 
dissenting). 
 85. Tome v. United States, 513 U.S. 150, 169–76 (1995) (Breyer, J., dis-
senting). 
 86. Id. 
 87. 128 S. Ct. 2678, 2695–709 (2008) (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
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victed of killing his ex-girlfriend, and he had a history of do-
mestic violence against her in the past. Breyer, along with Jus-
tice Stevens, wrote that the defendant forfeited his right to con-
front the witness by his acts.88 Giles is another case where a 
vote seemingly for the government and against a vulnerable de-
fendant can better be viewed as a vote in favor of a more vul-
nerable victim; it isn’t really a surprise when domestic violence 
against women causes a normally “liberal” Justice to prefer the 
prosecution’s view of the case. 
This leaves just one stray dissent for the government from 
Justice Breyer: Bond v. United States, where he thought no 
search occurred when police felt the contents of a bus passen-
ger’s carry-on bag.89 That vote is hard to explain. It has neither 
a clear political explanation nor an evident explanation rooted 
in judicial method or interpretative philosophy. So here, as we 
saw in discussing Justice Stevens, we find that not every dis-
sent against type can be accounted for neatly; no doubt some 
allowance must be made for a Justice to cast a genuinely mys-
terious dissenting vote every once in a while.  
F.  JOHN G. ROBERTS AND SAMUEL ALITO AND THE POSSIBILITY 
THAT A SHORTAGE OF DISSENTS AGAINST TYPE IS EVERYONE 
ELSE’S FAULT 
As noted a moment ago, it’s risky to draw quick conclusions 
about Justices based on their first years at the Court. With that 
said, Chief Justice John Roberts and Justice Samuel Alito have 
each completed two years there, and the results for purposes of 
this study can be stated briefly enough: neither of them has yet 
dissented in favor of a criminal defendant. They appear to be 
well on their way to ideologically predictable careers. 
Against this, one can imagine their reply—and it is a reply 
that could be made as well by any other Justice examined in 
this study: it is not entirely up to them whether to dissent. 
There is some validity to this point. It takes six to dissent: five 
to vote one way and one to vote the other. If five other members 
of the current Court vote for the government in a criminal case, 
then that voting bloc has to include one of the more “liberal” 
members of the Court. From this it follows that the arguments 
for the government must be strong, since the Court’s liberals 
don’t like to vote that way. But if the arguments are as strong 
 
 88. Id.   
 89. 529 U.S. 334, 339–43 (2000) (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
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as all that, what is there for Roberts to do but support them? To 
put the point differently: Roberts might say that whenever he 
votes for defendants, lots of his colleagues do, too: a fortiori, he 
doesn’t end up dissenting—but this has nothing to do with his 
tendencies, only with theirs.  
A good example of this phenomenon may be found in the 
career of Byron White. During his first decade on the Court 
(from 1962 to 1972) he did not once dissent in favor of a crimi-
nal defendant, although thirty-four percent of his total votes in 
criminal cases were in the defendant’s favor. From 1972 to 
1993, however, roughly forty percent of White’s dissents in 
criminal cases were in favor of defendants, while his total votes 
for the defendant dropped to twenty-six percent. The probable 
explanation is fairly straightforward: White’s ideological prefe-
rences were secure by the time Rehnquist joined the Court in 
1972; as the Court became more conservative, White was forced 
to dissent in some sorts of cases where he formerly had joined 
majorities (and he also joined the new, more conservative ma-
jorities in voting for the government in some cases where he 
formerly would have had to dissent). This observation does no 
damage to the model presented in this paper; Justice White 
was a relatively moderate Justice, and consistently split 70/30 
between voting for the government and the defendant. When 
looking at dissents, one must remember that the same ideologi-
cal preference can produce different footprints depending on a 
Justice’s colleagues.  
III.  CONCLUSION   
What, then, causes Supreme Court Justices to dissent 
against type? The conclusions of this inquiry may be summa-
rized as follows. 
1. Dissents against type—in other words, dissents for the 
government by a Justice who usually dissents just for defen-
dants, or vice versa—are rare, and the rate at which they are 
made in favor of the government or in favor of defendants is not 
usually affected much by the source of law involved. 
2. Dissents against type usually do not seem to reflect con-
sistent differences in legal methodology; for example, they do 
not tend to reflect disagreements about whether to use one in-
terpretive approach rather than another. Often an apparent 
dissent against type can be explained as expressing a policy 
preference that isn’t made evident by just looking at the case as 
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a typical conflict between government and a criminal defen-
dant. 
3. Dissents that initially appear to be against type some-
times aren’t; sometimes a case happens to involve a criminal 
defendant but raises larger legal issues that really have little to 
do with crime and punishment, as when an apparently criminal 
case actually has more to do with the Commerce Clause or the 
First Amendment. 
4. Dissents might seem to be against type, but in fact be 
quite characteristic, for a subtler reason: some feature of the 
facts may provoke different reactions than the legal subject 
matter of the case would ordinarily suggest. In the broad field 
of criminal law we find several examples. Disputes over the 
substance of criminal law—over what is legal and what is illeg-
al, and over the sentence for a given crime—are much more 
likely to cause conservatives to vote for defendants, and liberals 
to vote for the government, than disputes about procedural pro-
tections a defendant or convict is due. Dissents against type in 
habeas corpus cases, by contrast, are nearly unheard of. Prose-
cutions of white-collar criminals also are more likely than cases 
of violent crime to cause reversals of those kinds.  
5. Occasionally, a Justice really does dissent against type: 
he usually votes for the government but this time votes for the 
defendant (or vice versa), the legal issue is straightforward, 
and there is no factual feature of the case that explains the re-
sult. In the rare cases of this sort the explanation must be ei-
ther that the case provoked an idiosyncratic preference or belief 
on the part of the Justice or that the Justice was propelled to 
the result by methodological preferences. Convincing examples 
of the latter aren’t common for any Justice but can be found 
from time to time, particularly in Justice Scalia’s opinions. His 
adherence to the rule of lenity causes him to dissent in favor of 
criminal defendants more often than other conservatives who 
otherwise tend to share his positions.  
6. Some prominent trends in the apparent dissents against 
type might reasonably call for more careful consideration of 
how those types are defined. Being conservative does not neces-
sarily mean preferring the government’s position across the 
board in criminal cases; being liberal does not necessarily mean 
preferring the defendant’s position across the board. For some 
varieties of “conservative” and “liberal,” the terms really do 
mean those extreme things; but for others, it means a commit-
ment to more particular values that often, but not always, are 
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associated with the government or the defendant’s position. 
Conservatism does consistently seem to mean a preference for 
finality over accuracy when those values are in close conflict, 
and liberalism does consistently seem to mean the opposite. 
But there are some varieties of conservative and liberal that 
switch places, or at least come unmoored from their usual posi-
tions once in a while, as when the question in a criminal case is 
substantive—in other words, when it involves questions about 
who should go to prison and for how long. 
7. Dissents against type are no real threat to a realist view 
of the Supreme Court, though they might cause some trouble 
for clumsier claims that the Justices vote their monolithic poli-
cy preferences always and everywhere. What seems to be true, 
rather, is that Supreme Court Justices usually vote their prefe-
rences and empirical beliefs—and that cases where they appear 
not to do so can give interesting clues to the details of those 
preferences and the extent to which they occasionally feel con-
strained by the law. 
 
